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HABEAS MENTEM: REVISITING SUFFICIENCY-OF-COUNSEL
STANDARDS IN POST-AEDPA HABEAS CORPUS
PROCEEDINGS
Alejandra S. Alvarez*
Abstract
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
has contributed to long-standing complexities in our understanding of
habeas corpus and its function as a device for judicial inquiry into the
constitutionality of imprisonment. Since its passage and subsequent
interpretations by Congress and the courts, criminal defendants have
faced heightened challenges in seeking federal review of their state
convictions. The United States Supreme Court has yet to recognize a
concrete right to counsel for post-conviction proceedings—during which
most criminal defendants file their habeas petitions claiming, for
example, ineffective assistance of trial counsel—meaning that a large
number of defendants file their petitions without the aid of competent
counsel. A criminal defendant in this position risks defaulting his right to
litigate the merits of his habeas petition if represented by an attorney
without the requisite experience in the procedural difficulties of habeas
corpus at the state and federal levels and in the interplay between the two
court systems.
This Note discusses these procedural deficiencies and their grave
consequences against the backdrop of AEDPA’s opt-in provisions. These
provide that should a state hold itself out to the United States Attorney
General as having in place an adequate mechanism for providing counsel
in post-conviction proceedings, that state then has the opportunity to opt
into AEDPA and receive expedited federal review of capital habeas
petitions originating in the state. These provisions were instituted in an
effort to liberate the federal docket from consideration of frequent state
habeas petitions. But in its delegation to the Attorney General of this
decision-making authority, Congress failed to provide comprehensive
criteria by which the states and the Attorney General may assess the postconviction mechanism of any given state and the attorneys that comprise
it. Implicit in this unintelligible delegation of legislative authority is an
unacceptable endorsement of unfettered Attorney General discretion in
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deciding which states may qualify for quickened and arbitrary review of
capital habeas petitions.
With lives on the line and criminal law reform at the forefront of the
nation’s conscience, Congress should revisit AEDPA’s opt-in provisions
and provide clearer guidelines by which a state may model its postconviction proceedings to benefit from expedited federal capital habeas
processing. Providing such a framework would reorganize the country’s
priorities away from an emphasis on an “effective” death penalty and
towards the importance of providing criminal defendants, especially
capital defendants, with adequate post-conviction counsel. This would
ensure that state courts litigate habeas petitions to the fullest extent by
lawyers experienced in complex habeas corpus proceedings before such
proceedings ever need to reach federal review. If states truly desire the
proposed benefits of opting into AEDPA, they must first provide their
capital defendants with the tools and competent representation that they
deserve and that the Constitution ensures.
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Down this road there will be more education and less
priestly mandate, more advice and less control, more
consultation and less prescription, more facts and fewer
arcane pronouncements.1
—Fillmore H. Sanford
INTRODUCTION
On April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh and his accomplices detonated
a truck full of explosives adjacent to the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people and injuring hundreds
more.2 President Bill Clinton afterwards sought to assuage the fears of
the nation with respect to domestic terrorism3 by signing legislation to
1. Fillmore H. Sanford, Creative Health and the Principle of Habeas Mentem, 46 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 139, 142, 144 (1956). The title of this Note was derived from Sanford’s article, in
which he discussed his predictions for the future of public health and the manner in which
psychological institutions will evolve alongside it to address its most pressing aspects. See
generally id. (predicting the future of public health and psychological institutions). Though the
piece is largely geared towards health professions, Sanford’s statements and advice may be
extrapolated to other institutions in American society striving for a means to provide for and
protect both the collective as well as the individual body and mind. “Habeas mentem” means “the
right of a man to his own mind” and was thought to be coined by George Kelly in 1955. Id. at 144
& n.*.
2. Oklahoma City Bombing, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/oklahomacity-bombing [https://perma.cc/T2G9-ZNP9]. In letters to his friend, Bob Papovich, McVeigh
explained his motivations for bombing the federal building:
[T]he bombing was a retaliatory strike; a counter attack for the cumulative raids
(and subsequent violence and damage) that federal agents had participated in
over the preceding years . . . .
....
. . . [T]his bombing was meant as a pre-emptive (or pro-active) strike against
these forces and their command and control centres within the federal building.
...
....
It was in this climate . . . that I reached the decision to go on the offensive - to
put a check on government abuse of power where others ha[d] failed in stopping
the federal juggernaut run amok.
Tracy McVeigh, The McVeigh Letters: Why I Bombed Oklahoma, GUARDIAN (May 6, 2001, 1:21
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/may/06/mcveigh.usa [https://perma.cc/PVY4ZBQ3].
3.
The bombing in Oklahoma City was an attack on innocent children and
defenseless citizens. It was an act of cowardice, and it was evil.
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ensure criminal perpetrators like McVeigh were brought to justice and
kept behind bars for most of their lives, if not for good.4 The result was
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),5 an
act hastily6 thrown together in the wake of tragedy to appease the myriad
of agendas circulating in Washington, D.C. three years into President
Clinton’s tenure and two years following Republican majorities in the
House of Representatives and the Senate.7
The Act reflected President Clinton’s surprising acquiescence to
conservative attitudes8 towards the availability of federal habeas corpus
for criminal defendants, perhaps to foment support for his presidency and
its policies in the face of waning political influence9 or because he truly
believed, partisanship notwithstanding, that such stringent habeas corpus
reform was the solution to burgeoning crime rates in the United States
towards the end of the twentieth century.10 Regardless, since its passage,
AEDPA has wreaked havoc on the nation’s understanding of habeas

The United States will not tolerate it, and I will not allow the people of this
country to be intimidated by evil cowards.
....
. . . Let there be no room for doubt. We will find the people who did this. When
we do, justice will be swift, certain, and severe.
These people are killers, and they must be treated like killers.
Terror in Oklahoma City: Official Response; Statements by the President and Attorney General,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/20/us/terror-oklahoma-cityofficial-response-statements-president-attorney-general.html [https://perma.cc/9UFP-KJED].
4. See Liliana Segura, Gutting Habeas Corpus: The Inside Story of How Bill Clinton
Sacrificed Prisoners’ Rights for Political Gain, INTERCEPT (May 4, 2016, 1:54 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2016/05/04/the-untold-story-of-bill-clintons-other-crime-bill/ [https://
perma.cc/F2CD-7MUK] (explaining how, in an appearance on 60 Minutes the Sunday after the
bombing, President Clinton identified McVeigh’s crime as one fit for capital punishment).
5. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
6. See Segura, supra note 4 (“AEDPA’s dizzying provisions . . . were certainly a hasty
response to terrorism.”).
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.; see also Lynn Adelman, Who Killed Habeas Corpus?, DISSENT (2018),
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/who-killed-habeas-corpus-bill-clinton-aedpa-statesrights [https://perma.cc/2STE-95NL] (“He wanted to be perceived as being ‘tough on crime,’ and
habeas corpus had no politically significant constituency. A terrible bill thus became the law of
the land.”).
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corpus and the constitutional role that the Framers intended it to play in
the progression of defendants through the criminal justice system.11
Today, the country finds itself in paradoxical times mirroring those
that it faced twenty-three years ago. Then, a Democratic president passed
suffocating restrictions on a criminal defendant’s right to contest the
constitutionality of his imprisonment;12 now, a Republican president has
signed legislation13 kicking off an overhaul14 of the criminal justice
system and implementing a scheme of release for thousands of federal
inmates over an anticipated period of ten years.15
This Note argues that, with the First Step Act of 201816 in its
prototypical stages, now is the time to revisit aspects of AEDPA—
namely, its opt-in provisions17—and to restore habeas corpus to its
intended purview. A perfect storm of circumstances is passing through
the nation, affording opportunities for activists and legislators to
collaborate on refining the collective attitude towards defendants’
constitutional rights and to lobby Congress to reconsider at least some of
the most egregious aspects of AEDPA that have proven inarticulable and
11. See generally James Landman, You Should Have the Body: Understanding Habeas
Corpus, 72 SOC. EDUC. 99 (2008) (discussing the history of habeas corpus and its constitutional
role).
12. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2266 (2012); see also Nathan Nasrallah, Comment, The Wall
That AEDPA Built: Revisiting the Suspension Clause Challenge to the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1147, 1148 (2016) (bemoaning the “virtually
impenetrable wall of isolation” that AEDPA as well as subsequent Supreme Court interpretations
of AEDPA have built around habeas petitioners).
13. On December 21, 2018, President Donald Trump signed into law the First Step Act of
2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (to be codified in scattered sections of 18, 34, and 42
U.S.C.).
See
#FirstStepAct,
#FIRSTSTEPACT,
https://www.firststepact.org
[https://perma.cc/TW7T-CFJP]; see also Andrea Drusch, Trump’s Prison Plan to Release
Thousands of Inmates, MCCLATCHY DC BUREAU (Dec. 21, 2018, 12:18 PM),
https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/congress/article223414935.html
[http://web.archive.org/web/20190704063430/https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politicsgovernment/congress/article223414935.html] (describing the signing of the First Step Act and
potential long-term impacts of the Act).
14. Cf. German Lopez, The Senate’s Criminal Justice Reform Bill Is Not an “Overhaul.”
It’s a First Step., VOX (Dec. 19, 2018, 12:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/
12/19/18148413/first-step-act-senate-criminal-justice-reform-sweeping-overhaul [https://perma.
cc/G889-T9ZU] (emphasizing that the First Step Act, as the name implies, is the first step of
hopefully many in making “America’s federal criminal justice system less punitive”).
15. See Drusch, supra note 13.
16. Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (to be codified in scattered sections of 18, 34, and
42 U.S.C.).
17. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261–2266; see also Alexander Rundlet, Comment, Opting for Death:
State Responses to the AEDPA’S Opt-In Provisions and the Need for a Right to Post-Conviction
Counsel, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 661, 664 (1999) (arguing that AEDPA’s opt-in provisions did not
accomplish the “accomodat[ion of] fairness” that Congress intended for habeas petitioners in
drafting them, especially for indigent capital defendants).
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practicably unworkable for both the states seeking opt-in status18 and the
most esteemed members of the legal profession: the Justices of the
Supreme Court.19
Part I of this Note sets forth a brief history of habeas corpus, tracking
the evolution of “the Great Writ”20 once it reached the American colonies
alongside the historical conditions warranting its elaboration and
application to new crimes and new types of criminals.
Part II contextualizes the passage of AEDPA; analyzes more closely
its controversial opt-in provisions, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261–2266;
and identifies its delegation to the United States Attorney General the
authority to determine competency standards for appointed counsel in
habeas corpus proceedings as exceptionally detrimental to the national
conception of habeas corpus as a federal remedy and as an exemplar of
state courts working in tandem with federal courts to administer justice
consistent with constitutional principles.
Part III introduces the recently enacted First Step Act and discusses
how its promise for criminal law reform makes the present day an
appropriate time to revisit federal habeas corpus procedure and its bearing
on state and federal court systems.
Part IV suggests that Congress return to the drawing board,
particularly to AEDPA and its opt-in provisions as they relate to
sufficiency of counsel which, at the moment, do not contain intelligible
18. Though several have tried, no state has been able to opt into AEDPA. See infra note 56
and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Adelman, supra note 10 (describing the Supreme Court’s interpretations of
AEDPA as “disturbing”); Lincoln Caplan, The Destruction of Defendants’ Rights, NEW YORKER
(June 21, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-destruction-of-defendantsrights [https://perma.cc/3BC5-2EQ8] (“[T]he . . . Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly interpreted
[AEDPA] in the most inflexible and unyielding manner possible’ . . . .” (quoting Stephen R.
Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever
Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some
Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1221 (2015))); Jonathan R.
Nash, Statutory Limit on Federal Court Review of State Convictions Stifles Ideological
Differences, HILL (Dec. 11, 2017, 1:20 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/364275Statutory-limit-on-federal-court-review-of-state-convictions-stifles-ideological-differences
[https://perma.cc/EGC7-RGGL] (“AEDPA’s requirements are so stringent that they allow the
Supreme Court to decide by unanimous per curiam opinion a habeas case.”); see also Emily
Garcia Uhrig, The Sacrifice of Unarmed Prisoners to Gladiators: The Post-AEDPA Access-tothe-Courts Demand for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Habeas Corpus, 14 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1219, 1228 (2012) (“Federal courts have devoted substantial energy since 1996
attempting to understand the intricate mechanics of the statute of limitations as applied, as well
as its interplay with the remaining procedural doctrines. The resulting body of law is inordinately
complex and vexing to even the most experienced jurists.”).
20. Eve Brensike Primus, Litigating Federal Habeas Corpus Cases: One Equitable
Gateway at a Time, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, July 2018, at 3; see Landman, supra note 11, at 99.
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principles21 by which states may model their post-conviction processes in
satisfaction of the opt-in requirements. The current statute has spawned
several consequences that are scattered along the spectrum of attitudes
towards the death penalty specifically. At one end lies relief: If no state
can opt into AEDPA, capital defendants are not exposed to expedited
(and oftentimes, reckless) federal review of their cases to keep the federal
habeas docket moving. At the other end lies discontent with the
impossibility of opting into AEDPA and, inherent in this, the inefficiency
of federal review of habeas petitions. This inefficiency ensures that
capital defendants remain on death row for decades, straining the state
resources that were already exhausted on litigating their cases.
More specifically, this Note proposes as a next step that Congress
amend the opt-in provisions of AEDPA to explicitly mandate the
minimum acceptable competency standards for appointed counsel in
habeas corpus proceedings. In setting forth uniform standards by which
every state may assess post-conviction counsel, habeas petitions stand a
better chance of being litigated thoroughly and honestly at the state level,
meaning that, perhaps, states would be able to successfully opt into
AEDPA and federal habeas petitions, benefited by expedited review.
Ultimately, this would liberate the federal docket, legitimize any
necessary federal review of state habeas proceedings, and put into place
workable mechanisms by which states may consider habeas petitions at
their very inception.
I. A HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE UNITED STATES
The history of the writ of habeas corpus is as long as it is complex.
With origins in English common law,22 it was created by medieval courts
to grant incarcerated individuals the opportunity to contest the legality of

21. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989) (holding that Congress’s
delegation of power to the United States Sentencing Commission did not violate the nondelegation
principle and, further, was “sufficiently specific and detailed to meet constitutional
requirements”); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (finding that
Congress must provide, in its delegation of authority, “an intelligible principle” for agencies to
use as a guide in developing regulations).
22. Landman, supra note 11, at 99.
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their imprisonment.23 Since its foundation, the prerogative writ24 has
evolved with the transplant of English common law to American
circumstances and exigencies.25 Pieced together from the language in
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution,26 the writ has functioned over
time, as initially conceived, as a device for judicial inquiry into the
constitutionality of one’s imprisonment,27 an extension of executive war
power premised on the Suspension Clause,28 and a means of and
inspiration for legislative coordination between federal and state
governments on issues of prisoners’ rights and due process application.29
Given that the writ has never been explicitly provided for in any
governing document since its inception,30 it is no surprise that American
legislatures and courts have struggled over time with adequately defining
the scope and allocation of the various rights that the writ affords to
criminal defendants. The Constitution defines the writ of habeas corpus
by when it may not be denied: effectively, during times of peace.31
Though there was little occasion during the late eighteenth century to
exercise the writ,32 the fundamental lack of clarity regarding which
23. See Magna Carta Translation, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/
featured-documents/magna-carta/translation.html [https://perma.cc/TN4A-PBMD] (“No freeman
is to be taken or imprisoned . . . save by lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land.
To no-one will we sell or deny of delay right or justice.”); see also Landman, supra note 11, at 99
(“The basic purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to afford a person who has been detained the
chance to challenge the legality of his or her detention.”); Robert D. Pursley, The Federal Habeas
Corpus Process: Unraveling the Issues, 7 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 115, 116 (1995) (describing
the origination of the writ); Jurisdiction: Habeas Corpus, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/jurisdiction-habeas-corpus [https://perma.cc/7RE8-HHTV]
(describing the general judicial process for the writ).
24. A prerogative writ is “[a]n antiquated term for any writ (court order) directed to
government agencies, public officials, or another court.” Cornell Law Sch., Prerogative Writ,
LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prerogative_writ [https://perma.cc/GRL7MVP4].
25. See Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text,
Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 670 (2008).
26. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
27. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82; CASSIA SPOHN & CRAIG
HEMMENS, COURTS: A TEXT/READER 501 (2d ed. 2012) (“[H]abeas corpus challenges the
constitutionality of one’s confinement.”).
28. President Abraham Lincoln premised his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during
the Civil War on the language in Article I, Section 9, commonly referred to as the Suspension
Clause. See Landman, supra note 11, at 100; see also Zachary Cloud, What Exactly is Habeas
Corpus?, CRIM. L. & PSYCHOL. BLOG (Aug. 19, 2012), https://zacharycloud.wordpress.com/
2012/08/19/what-exactly-is-habeas-corpus/ [https://perma.cc/8PEQ-RBLK].
29. See Landman, supra note 11, at 101–03, 105; Pursley, supra note 23, at 118.
30. See Pursley, supra note 23, at 117.
31. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
32. See Pursley, supra note 23, at 117.
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governmental authority was responsible for considering and ensuring the
constitutionality of imprisonment under federal law prompted Congress
to enact the Judiciary Act of 1789,33 explicitly granting federal courts the
power to issue the writ.34
The Civil War engendered concern and debate over concentrating this
power in the federal judiciary. On the one hand, President Abraham
Lincoln opined that its exercise and, more importantly, its suspension
should be a joint power shared by both Congress and the Executive.35 On
the other hand, acrimony among the states, the South’s ultimate secession
from the Union, and the war that followed gave rise to the concern that
state incarceration rates of northerners and persons recently freed from
slavery in the South would increase unless checked by the federal
mechanism.36 Ultimately, these concerns prompted Congress to extend
the writ of habeas corpus in 1867 to federal court review of state
incarceration.37
From this expansion of judicial influence emerged a new dynamic
between the seemingly ever-expanding power of the federal judiciary to
review state incarceration and the states’ interest in determining by their
own standards the grounds on which to incarcerate and sustain
incarceration.38 Since the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,39 courts across the
country have grappled with the availability of federal habeas corpus
review for state court convictions out of a multifaceted fear of
encroaching on state court independence and deemphasizing judicial
33. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
34. See Pursley, supra note 23, at 117.
35. See Landman, supra note 11, at 101 (“[A]re all the laws but one to go unexecuted and
the Government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated?” (quoting Abraham Lincoln,
President, U.S., Address Before Congress (July 4, 1861))); see also id. at 101 (presenting the
counterargument of Chief Justice Robert B. Taney in support of Congress’s exclusive power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus).
36. Max Rosenn, The Great Writ—A Reflection of Societal Change, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337,
342 (1983).
37. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385–86 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (2012)); see Landman, supra note 11, at 102 (pointing out that, though the statute
does not specifically reference the states or an explicit grant of federal power to review state
convictions, the language “any person” who has been unlawfully “restrained” has been interpreted
to encompass those at both the federal and state levels); Pursley, supra note 23, at 133 n.3
(pointing out the same).
38. See Landman, supra note 11, at 100.
39. Ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241) (“That the several
courts of the United States, and the several justices and judges of such courts, within their
respective jurisdictions, in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to
grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty
in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
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efficiency. This cautious approach to tackling the interstices of federal
and state court systems via the habeas petition impeded the development
of a seamless, uniform, and unambiguous habeas process.
The uncertainties in the scope and application of the writ—in
particular, the exploitation of federal habeas corpus review by state court
defendants—prompted the Judicial Conference of the United States to
organize a committee over a century later in 1988 to discuss a means by
which Congress could reduce the “unnecessary delay and repetition” that
had been built into a federal court’s review of state convictions.40 Many
of the recommendations that emerged from the subsequently titled
“Powell Committee” were eventually codified in AEDPA, and they
heavily emphasized the preeminence of state rights and resources in
reviewing habeas corpus claims.41 This emphasis sought to divert federal
time and energy away from consideration of these petitions and
streamlined the process of review at the state court level,42 thus dealing a
significant blow to the feasibility of effective review of many defendants’
federal habeas claims.
II. THE PASSAGE OF AEDPA
Several political exigencies gave rise to the passage of AEDPA and
its subsequent social consequences. Further, many of its provisions have
complicated its application for most of those involved in the criminal
justice system—most importantly, criminal defendants.
A. The Predecessor Crime Bill of 1994
AEDPA is a heavily criticized law.43 It was passed the year after the
Oklahoma City bombing and two years after the enactment of the
controversial Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
(the 1994 Crime Bill).44 The latter was passed in response to an uptick in
crime, which culminated in a collection of what many have called
40. See Jon B. Gould, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied? A Contemporary Review of
Capital Habeas Corpus, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 273, 274 (2008) (quoting AD HOC COMM. ON FED.
HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, COMMITTEE REPORT (1989), reprinted in 135 CONG. REC.
24,694 (1989)).
41. Id. at 274–75.
42. Id. at 274.
43. See, e.g., Samuel R. Wiseman, What is Federal Habeas Worth?, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1157,
1160 (2015) (“AEDPA has failed at reducing the volume, pace, or complexity of federal
review.”); Larry Yackle, AEDPA Mea Culpa, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 329, 329 (2012) (“[AEDPA]
has been a conceptual and practical nightmare—crippling the ability of federal courts to enforce
federal rights, disserving legitimate state interests, delivering unjust and bizarre results even in
the run of ordinary cases, and, at best, squandering resources on endless and pointless procedural
digressions.”).
44. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
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“punitive” provisions—unconcerned with the rehabilitation of criminals
or the prevention of recidivism.45 Some of the 1994 Crime Bill’s more
salient features provided billions of dollars in funding for prisons, the
employment of 100,000 police officers, an itemization of offenses for
which one could be considered for the death penalty, and a mandatory
life sentence for particular repeat offenders.46 Since its passage in 1994,
the federal prison population has doubled.47
B. A Closer Look at AEDPA’s Disruptive Provisions
While the 1994 Crime Bill largely targeted federal crime reform and
had a relatively minimal impact on state court proceedings,48 AEDPA
appeared to bridge that federalist gap more effectively by identifying
exactly how state court proceedings would bear on federal court regard
for any one habeas petition. The law imposed, among other provisions, a
one-year statute of limitations on filing a federal habeas petition,49 a
restriction on successive habeas filings,50 and a condition to the
availability of the petition that the state court’s determination be
inconsistent with established constitutional principles before it may be
reconsidered by the federal court sitting in review.51 The law also
included several “opt-in provisions,” terms that functioned as a means by
which a state could hope to improve its own collateral review proceedings
in exchange for a well-oiled system of capital punishment.52 In other
words, if a state opted into a set of terms—providing indigent capital
defendants with paid attorneys who were neither their trial nor their
appellate attorneys for their post-conviction proceedings and ensuring
that these attorneys were appointed in conformity with professional
standards of competency—that state would be afforded speedy
consideration of any subsequent federal capital habeas filings.53 These
perks for opt-in states—whose qualification as such is determined not by
45. See Jessica Lussenhop, Clinton Crime Bill: Why Is It So Controversial?, BBC NEWS
(Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36020717 [https://perma.cc/332MHCF4].
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012).
50. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b), 2255; see also Lyn S. Entzeroth, Struggling for Federal
Judicial Review of Successive Claims of Innocence: A Study of How Federal Courts Wrestled with
the AEDPA to Provide Individuals Convicted of Non-Existent Crimes with Habeas Corpus
Review, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75, 88–91 (2005) (discussing the implications of this restriction).
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Gould, supra note 40, at 275 (discussing the
implications of this provision).
52. Gould, supra note 40, at 275–76; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261–2266.
53. See Gould, supra note 40, at 275–76.
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the state itself but by the United States Attorney General and the Justice
Department54—would require habeas petitioners to file their claims in
federal court within six months of the denial by the state court of their
direct appeal, after which the federal district court need only spend up to
180 days considering the case and the federal appellate court up to 120
days.55 Though a number of states have sought qualification under this
portion of AEDPA, not a single state has been admitted as an opt-in state
as of last year.56
This insinuates that the less-laudable elements of the opt-in
provisions—the reduced deadline for filing and the timeframe in which
federal courts must rule on a capital habeas petition, both holding critical
implications for defendants facing life sentences or death—have not been
taken advantage of by any state as of yet. However, this also means that
no states have successfully held themselves out as having a mechanism
for appointing post-conviction counsel in compliance with the opt-in
provisions. As of 2018, Arizona and Texas, two states with significant
numbers of defendants on death row, have renewed their applications to
opt into AEDPA,57 backed by support from former Attorney General Jeff
Sessions. But, at the same time, these states’ actions remain vulnerable to
intense attack from critics concerned with the adequacy of these states’
proposed state mechanisms for appointing post-conviction counsel.58

54. The USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177,
§ 507, 120 Stat. 192, 250 (2006) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2261), transferred the
authority to decide opt-in certification from the federal courts to the Attorney General. See
Andrew Cohen, Death Sentences Are Down. Jeff Sessions Has a Plan to Change That, ROLLING
STONE (Apr. 5, 2018, 5:25 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/deathsentences-are-down-jeff-sessions-has-a-plan-to-change-that-629353/ [https://perma.cc/3T2Z-5SLU].
55. Gould, supra note 40, at 276.
56. See Rundlet, supra note 17, at 678–79 (pointing out how “death belt” states like Texas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, in addition to California, which houses
the most inmates on death row in the United States, have not opted into AEDPA); see also Douglas
A. Berman, AEDPA Accelerant: Examining Prospects for Speedier Capital Appeals for “Opt-in”
States, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (Apr. 3, 2018, 11:09 AM), https://sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencing_law_and_policy/2018/04/aedpa-accelerant-examining-prospects-for-speedier-capital
-appeals-for-opt-in-states.html [https://perma.cc/7UTY-GG88] (noting how no state has been
approved as an opt-in state but that some states have sought or are seeking qualification).
57. See Keri Blakinger, ‘Express Lane to Death’: Texas Seeks Approval to Speed up Death
Penalty Appeals, Execute More Quickly, HOUS. CHRON. (Apr. 2, 2018, 8:40 PM),
https://www.chron.com/news/article/Express-lane-to-death-Texas-seeks-approval-12799384.php
[https://perma.cc/J9XG-EXZ2].
58. See infra Section IV.B.
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C. Interpretation and Application of AEDPA
The procedural complexities associated with navigating AEDPA
underscore the urgent need for legal counsel and political officials who
are well-versed in post-conviction procedure. Pursuit of this goal would
serve to protect petitioners’ rights, promote systemic efficiency, and
generate positive change.
1. What Seems to Be the Problem?
The complexity of habeas corpus as a tool for federal inquiry into the
constitutionality of state imprisonment stems from the procedural
quagmire59 that courts have read into and upheld on review of issues
concerning the availability of habeas corpus ever since the passage of
AEDPA.60 Plotting the progression of a habeas petitioner’s claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel illustrates the difficulty that
petitioners face in convincing a federal court to review their case and the
grave circumstances under which a petitioner pursues an ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim, as well as the consequences of its failure.61
This particular petition further emphasizes the value of having effective
assistance of counsel at every stage of litigation,62 not only for the
59. See Casey C. Kannenberg, Wading through the Morass of Modern Federal Habeas
Review of State Capital Prisoners’ Claims, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 107, 109 (2009) (“The
problems associated with the modern morass of federal habeas review of state prisoners’ claims
are far from novel.”).
60. See, e.g., Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1193–94 (2018) (holding that a “look
through” presumption must be employed when reviewing an unexplained state court decision).
61. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1837–41 (1994) (detailing, in this
pre-AEDPA paper, the variety of ways in which trial counsel may fail a capital defendant and
emphasizing that poor representation is most often embodied in counsel’s failure to distinguish
his client’s case from those in which the death penalty would otherwise be appropriate for
consideration); see also Michael C. Dorf, Supreme Court to Consider When a Criminal Defendant
Must Pay with His Life for His Lawyer’s Error, VERDICT (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://verdict.justia.com/2017/01/25/supreme-court-consider-criminal-defendant-must-pay-lifelawyers-error [https://perma.cc/5E8Z-NEFC] (“One . . . case[] . . . presents a fundamental
question: whether a criminal defendant should pay with his life for an error made by his lawyer?”).
62. Whether such a right to counsel exists at every stage of litigation has been contested in
light of the Sixth Amendment’s “Assistance of Counsel” provision. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
For an engaging blog post on the right to counsel debate, see Steve Vladeck, Opinion Analysis: A
New Remedy, but No Right, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 21, 2012, 10:30 AM), https://www.scotus
blog.com/2012/03/opinion-analysis-a-new-remedy-but-no-right/ [https://perma.cc/5WV3-6MHQ],
which identified how the Supreme Court has drawn a “bright line” in recognizing the right to
effective assistance of counsel for direct appeals but not for collateral challenges. Vladeck also
discussed Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). Id. In Martinez, the Court was tasked with
deciding whether a right to counsel exists when state collateral proceedings present the first
opportunity for a criminal defendant to challenge his conviction by filing a habeas petition
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defendant’s benefit but also for the efficiency of the judicial system as a
whole.
Habeas filings specifically claiming ineffective assistance of counsel
are ubiquitous.63 Inherent in a habeas petition alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel is a request for review of the underlying actions (or
more often than not, omissions) of one’s trial lawyer.64 Several of
AEDPA’s provisions, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2256, lay out the
contours of and eligibility for filing a habeas petition.65 But, again, any
one petition’s trajectory is ultimately determined by a criminal
defendant’s capitalization on the interstices between state court
proceedings and federal opportunities to review them. These interstices
are often exceedingly difficult to take advantage of when uncounseled at
the post-conviction stage.
To begin, habeas petitioners generally may not file for reconsideration
of their incarceration on direct appeal.66 Rather, they must await the
opportunity to correct any perceived defect in their trial representation by
filing a post-conviction petition.67 Though both are subsequent to a
criminal defendant’s conviction, post-conviction petitions and direct
claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Martinez, 566 U.S. at 5, 9. The Court held,
somewhat ambiguously and without recognizing that such a right exists, that a lack of adequate
post-conviction counsel could excuse a defendant in federal habeas proceedings for any
procedural default of his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims. See id. at 9; see also
Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2065–66 (2017) (drawing another bright line in holding that a
lack of adequate post-conviction counsel would not excuse the same procedural default of
ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims); JK, Extending Martinez, HABEAS CORPUS
BLOG
(Jan.
27,
2017,
10:58
AM),
https://habeascorpusblog.typepad.com/habeas_corpus_blog/2017/01/index.html
[https://perma.cc/NT3G-D6AJ] (anticipating the Court’s consideration of Davila v. Davis). This
Section further discusses the concept of procedural default and its consequences.
63. See Justin F. Marceau, Embracing A New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1161–62 (2012) (“[I]neffective assistance of counsel is ‘by far the most
common basis for relief sought in habeas petitions . . . .’” (quoting Keith Cunningham-Parmeter,
Dreaming of Effective Assistance: The Awakening of Cronic’s Call to Presume Prejudice from
Representational Absence, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 827, 832 (2003))); Eve Brensike Primus, Procedural
Obstacles to Reviewing Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Claims in State and Federal
Postconviction Proceedings, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2009, at 6, 7 (“Ineffective assistance of trial counsel
is one of the most frequently raised claims in state and federal postconviction petitions.”).
64. See Primus, supra note 63.
65. See, e.g., Cornell Law Sch., Habeas Corpus, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/habeas_corpus [https://perma.cc/J779-AQLE] (noting that a
habeas petition must be filed by a petitioner in custody after he has exhausted all state remedies,
including an appeals process; that “[t]he . . . petition must be in writing and signed and verified
either by the petitioner . . . or by someone acting on his . . . behalf”; and that the petition must
include the legal grounds for filing—mirroring the requirements set forth in AEDPA).
66. See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 680 (2007).
67. See Primus, supra note 63.
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appeals differ in their timing and in the scope of what is considered from
the record below.68
A direct appeal must be filed within a short timeframe following the
rendering of a conviction.69 On appeal, a court is limited to a review of
the record from the trial court, including its conclusions of law based on
the facts explicitly contained in the record.70 Direct appeals are improper
vehicles for addressing a trial lawyer’s subpar representation of a criminal
defendant because, more often than not, the record will not contain
explicit references to or demonstrations of ways in which counsel erred
procedurally or substantively at trial.71 These shortcomings are usually
aired by the defendant once an unfavorable conviction has been rendered,
meaning that the trial record will likely not adequately support a
defendant’s claim if raised on direct appeal.72 As a result, criminal
defendants often must await the post-conviction motions process to
address the correction of an alleged error in a defendant’s trial
representation.73 A post-conviction motion typically affords the
defendant the opportunity to have an evidentiary hearing,74 during which
testimony and proof of a trial lawyer’s subpar representation of the
criminal defendant may supplement the trial record.75
However, petitioners typically file post-conviction motions with a
trial court after a defendant has lost on direct appeal,76 thus elongating
68. Id. at 1–2; see also The Difference Between a Direct Appeal and Post-Conviction Relief
in Florida, SPATZ L. FIRM, PL (May 7, 2018), https://www.spatzlawfirm.com/blog/2018/05/thedifference-between-a-direct-appeal-and-post-conviction-relief-in-florida.shtml [https://perma.cc/
8FDZ-NNFT].
69. See, e.g., The Difference Between a Direct Appeal and Post-Conviction Relief in
Florida, supra note 68.
70. See generally, e.g., Christina Gomez, Vexed and Perplexed: Reviewing Mixed
Questions of Law and Fact on Appeal, COLO. LAW., March 2018, at 25 (discussing standards of
review).
71. See Primus, supra note 63, at 7.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 7–8.
74. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2012) for an exception to the availability of evidentiary
hearings in habeas corpus proceedings. This Note addresses this AEDPA provision in upcoming
pages.
75. See, e.g., Post Conviction Remedies, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
criminal_justice/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_postconvicti
on_blk/#22-4.1 [https://perma.cc/R4VJ-SRC2] (recommending evidentiary hearings that could
supplement the record). But see Tigran W. Eldred, The Psychology of Conflicts of Interest in
Criminal Cases, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 43, 83 (2009) (underscoring a trial lawyer’s tendency towards
self-preservation when his representation has been called into question during state postconviction proceedings by a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
76. See The Difference Between a Direct Appeal and Post-Conviction Relief in Florida,
supra note 68 (acknowledging that post-conviction proceedings vary from state to state). Postconviction motions are appealable. Cf. Primus, supra note 63, at 10–11 (discussing the difficulty
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the amount of time that a defendant must wait to make a case contending
ineffective assistance of counsel.77 By the time that a post-conviction
motion has the chance to be considered, a defendant may have already
served a substantial portion of his sentence. Moreover, witnesses critical
to the substantiation of a defendant’s claims may be impossible to
contact, or corroborative evidence may be tainted, lost, or destroyed.78
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations on filing a post-conviction
habeas petition in federal court appears to mitigate some of these
concerns inherent in having to wait too long to have the facts of one’s
case reconsidered.79 If uncounseled, however, a defendant is often
completely unaware that this statute of limitations begins to run as soon
as his conviction is affirmed, and an overwhelming number of such
claims end up expiring at the state level before these defendants can do
anything about it.80 Criminal defendants are not constitutionally
guaranteed the right to counsel for litigating the petition at this stage of
their cases,81 contributing to default of the claims themselves or filing of
the claims without a lawyer to help them comprehend post-conviction
proceedings.
Habeas petitions that successfully migrate from state post-conviction
review to federal court review face another set of procedural obstacles to
being heard in a timely and deferential fashion. AEDPA’s exhaustion
requirement provides that if defendants have not, for whatever reason,
complied with state remedial processes or state procedural rules at trial,
then they have effectively waived the chance for federal review of their
claim premised in any part on the prejudicial effects of failing to adhere
to those guidelines.82 A pertinent example of procedural default lies at the
heart of many federal habeas petitions claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel: a state procedural rule mandates invocation of an ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim in a post-conviction proceeding, but if that
same state does not provide defendants with post-conviction counsel, an
of appealing a petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because of the specter of possible
procedural default).
77. See Primus, supra note 63, at 7; The Difference Between a Direct Appeal and PostConviction Relief in Florida, supra note 68 (asserting that “time is of the essence” in filing postconviction motions to, presumably, preserve the momentum of a petition seeking reevaluation of
evidence, jurisdiction, or attorney demeanor at trial—to name a few bases for seeking postconviction relief).
78. See Primus, supra note 63, at 7–8.
79. See Primus, supra note 20, at 4 (discussing AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations).
80. See Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’S Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 443, 482 (2007).
81. See Primus, supra note 63, at 8.
82. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (2012); see also Primus, supra note 20, at 5 (discussing
the doctrine of procedural default as an obstacle to judicial review).
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unaided defendant who has not been cautioned to preserve his claim,
upon entreating a federal court to hear it, will have defaulted it without
even realizing the consequences of his passivity.83
Another salient difficulty habeas petitioners face at the threshold of
federal review under AEDPA is the unavailability of evidentiary hearings
should defendants fail to prove the factual merits of their ineffectiveassistance claims at trial or supplement their trial records with evidence
of substandard trial representation.84 As mentioned before, trial counsel
deficiency is often not reflected in any tangible format, let alone the trial
record.85 To meet AEDPA’s requirement contained in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(2) and qualify for a federal evidentiary hearing despite an
undeveloped record, a defendant must additionally prove by “clear and
convincing evidence” that he is innocent of his charged crimes and that
his habeas claim is supported by a retroactively applied Supreme Court
holding or by factual evidence that, despite the exercise of due diligence,
could not have been unearthed at trial.86 An uncounseled defendant
lacking access to records, evidence, and argumentation opportunities will
likely have an exceptionally difficult time proving the arduous prongs of
this statutory test.87
Finally, if a habeas petition manages to reach federal consideration,
federal courts employ AEDPA’s highly deferential standard of review to
preceding state court adjudications of the petition’s merits.88 Section
2254(d) of 28 U.S.C. states that a federal court will not grant review of a
petition that has been adjudicated at the state level unless it:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or

83. See Primus, supra note 63, at 10.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 7.
86. Leah M. Litman, Legal Innocence and Federal Habeas, 104 VA. L. REV. 417, 430
(2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B)); Primus, supra note 63, at 10; see also Joseph L.
Hoffmann, Innocence and Federal Habeas After AEDPA: Time for the Supreme Court to Act, 24
FED. SENT’G REP. 300, 303 (2012) (arguing for federal habeas courts’ recognition of a “[b]are
[i]nnocence” claim); Primus, supra note 20, at 16 (confirming that such a claim has been
recognized by the Supreme Court’s creation of the “innocence bypass” for the habeas statute of
limitations).
87. Primus, supra note 63, at 10–11.
88. See Gregory J. O’Meara, You Can’t Get There from Here: Ineffective Assistance Claims
in Federal Circuit Courts After AEDPA, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 545, 554–55, 555 nn.56–57 (2009).
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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.89
Prior to AEDPA, federal courts employed de novo review of habeas
petitions.90 Now, habeas petitioners must prove the state court’s legal
conclusions were in direct contravention of either Supreme Court
precedent or were violative of jurists’ reasonable interpretation of the
facts at bar, which is a seemingly insurmountable standard to meet.91
Habeas petitions claiming ineffective assistance of counsel routinely
state dissatisfaction with trial counsel’s failure to present witnesses, seek
testing of critical evidence (for example, DNA testing), object to
prosecutorial evidence, suppress evidence, or interview key witnesses.92
Others take issue with the jury that was selected for trial, point to timing
issues with trial counsel’s filing of certain motions, allege that trial
counsel argued inconsistently or to the defendant’s detriment, failed to
investigate a defendant’s mental competence to stand trial, erred at the
capital sentencing phase, counseled the client incorrectly to plead guilty,
or overall provided poor and uninformed advice as to how the defendant
should treat a plea offer.93
Perhaps the most disturbing accounts of trial counsel deficiencies—
recounted in Professional Responsibility courses as cautionary tales for
budding lawyers—involve deficiencies at trial that reflect on the fitness
and character of the trial lawyers themselves. Courts have rightfully
found prejudice to the defendant when trial counsel has slept through
portions of trial, been neglectful of his licensing such that the
representation was technically unlawful, had such aggravating health
conditions that he could not adequately follow the arc of trial and properly

89. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
90. See O’Meara, supra note 88, at 554–55; Patrick J. Fuster, Comment, Taming Cerberus:
The Beast at AEDPA’s Gates, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1325, 1333 (2017).
91. See, e.g., Ram Eachambadi, Supreme Court: Federal Habeas Court Should “Look
Through” Unexplained State Court Judgment, JURIST (Apr. 17, 2018, 8:06 PM),
https://www.jurist.org/news/2018/04/supreme-court-federal-habeas-court-should-look-throughunexplained-state-court-judgment/ [https://perma.cc/652L-LJLP] (explaining the Supreme
Court’s holding in Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188 (2018), that a federal court sitting in review
of an unexplained state court decision on the merits of a habeas petition should “look through”
the decision to the most recent related state court decision that articulated a rationale, raising a
presumption that the unexplained decision followed the same rationale as the predecessor decision
(quoting Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192)).
92. See EMILY M. WEST, COURT FINDINGS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS
IN POST-CONVICTION APPEALS AMONG THE FIRST 255 DNA EXONERATION CASES 4 (2010).
93. See TERESA L. NORRIS, SUMMARIES OF PUBLISHED SUCCESSFUL INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS PRE-WIGGINS V. SMITH 100–83 (2015).
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respond to procedural cues as a consequence, or failed to appear at all to
represent clients at key stages of the case.94
Since its passage, the United States Supreme Court has applied
AEDPA’s text in a strictly mechanical manner, no matter the assumed
political proclivities of its Justices.95 Such mechanical application of
AEDPA’s provisions over the span of two decades has established the
maze of procedural pitfalls described above that habeas petitioners must
navigate to make the jump from state conviction to federal pursuit of
relief for, more often than not, an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
claim. The manner in which the Supreme Court has interpreted AEDPA
has had particularly startling consequences96 for individuals sentenced to
death at the state level, claiming that their sentences resulted from
ineffective counsel. Further, current tension over the death penalty and
its future relevance for the criminal justice system stems in large part
from the rules that the Supreme Court has read into AEDPA as applicable
to defendants across the board, no matter the distinguishable facts of their
cases.97
2. The Attorney General’s Role
AEDPA originally intended federal courts to determine state opt-in
qualifications.98 But in 2001, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that,
although Arizona had, in its opinion, met the requirements in AEDPA for
opting into 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261–2266, the Court would not confer opt-in
status or benefits because Arizona failed to comply with the timeliness
requirement of its own post-conviction system in the case at bar.99
Congress responded to this and other thwarted attempts to opt into
AEDPA100 by transferring the decision-making power to the Attorney
94. See id. at 91, 344–46, 348.
95. See Adelman, supra note 10; see also Emily Bazelon, The Law That Keeps People on
Death Row Despite Flawed Trials, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 17, 2015), https://www.ny
times.com/2015/07/17/magazine/the-law-that-keeps-people-on-death-row-despite-flawed-trials.
html [https://perma.cc/38B3-YMNV] (criticizing the Supreme Court’s application of AEDPA’s
text).
96. See, e.g., Reinhardt, supra note 19, at 1239.
97. See, e.g., Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018); Dunn v. Madison, 138 S. Ct.
9, 11–12 (2017) (per curiam); Kernan v. Cuero, 138 S. Ct. 4, 6–7, 9 (2017) (per curiam); Cullen
v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 174 (2011); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 92 (2011); Carey v.
Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 72, 77 (2006); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66, 68, 77 (2003).
98. Cf. Jennifer Ponder, The Attorney General’s Power of Certification Regarding State
Mechanisms to Opt-in to Streamlined Habeas Corpus Procedure, 6 CRIM. L. BRIEF, Spring 2011,
at 38, 41 (noting that Congress reallocated this power from “the federal courts to the Attorney
General”).
99. See Spears v. Stewart, 283 F.3d 992, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002).
100. See sources cited supra note 56.
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General in 2005 via the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005,101 likely hoping that states would find the
Attorney General a more pliable arbitrator.
The Attorney General’s first attempt to promulgate a list of the
standards by which the Department would assess opt-in applications
occurred in 2007.102 To the disappointment of many, Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales did little to help elucidate the vague provisions already
set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261–2266. His proposed regulations reiterated
their purpose, provided a definitions section, and described the
certification requirements and the “mechanics of the certification
process” for states seeking qualification.103 However, instead of
addressing how certain highly debatable terms in AEDPA could be
interpreted and applied uniformly going forward, the definitions section
only defined two largely uncontested concepts: “appropriate State
official” and “State postconviction proceedings.”104 Similarly, the
certification requirements added little to the existing text of AEDPA:
states were still required to appoint counsel, compensate them
appropriately, and ensure that they conformed to standards of
competency.105
Lastly, the Attorney General illustrated the deceptively simple
application process for states wishing to opt in: The state’s “appropriate
State official” must submit a request for certification attesting to the
official’s proper authority and confirming that the official notified the
state’s highest court of the state’s intention to opt in.106 Next, the Attorney
General must publish notice in the Federal Register of the state’s pending
application, which in turn would provide the public the opportunity to
submit supplemental materials and commentary on the state’s
qualifications for opting into AEDPA.107 Should the Department of
Justice grant the state opt-in status, the Attorney General would not have
the right to subsequently decertify that state, even if the state’s postconviction mechanisms evolved out of conformity with AEDPA.108
Attorney General Gonzales’s “proposed regulations incited a nearly
riotous response.”109 Thirty-two thousand entities criticized the
101. Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 507, 120 Stat. 192, 250 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2265
(2012)).
102. See Kannenberg, supra note 59, at 153.
103. Certification Process for State Capital Counsel Systems, 72 Fed. Reg. 31,217, 31,218
(proposed June 6, 2007) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 26).
104. Id. at 31,218, 31,219.
105. See Kannenberg, supra note 59, at 154–55.
106. See Certification Process for State Capital Counsel Systems, 72 Fed. Reg. at 31,220.
107. See Kannenberg, supra note 59, at 155–56.
108. See id. at 156.
109. Id.
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regulations’ lack of substance as well as the inappropriateness of
consolidating this power in the Attorney General.110 In 2008, Gonzales
was replaced by Michael Mukasey, and the Department purported to take
the public’s comments into account when editing the regulations for
republication.111 When the Department unveiled the finalized regulations
to the public on December 11, 2008, it was clear that Attorney General
Mukasey had changed little, if anything, about the original proposal.112
He cited to AEDPA itself in explaining his reticence to expound on
anything in the regulations:113 Section 2265(a)(3) of 28 U.S.C. stated that
“[t]here are no requirements for certification or for application of this
chapter other than those expressly stated in this chapter.”114 Though this
interpretation of the Attorney General’s role has received pushback,115 it
is not completely unfounded: Congress provided little guidance for how
an Attorney General may elaborate on his duties and on the requirements
already contained in AEDPA. Further, any provision seemingly
addressing this role contained diction that, at least on its face, appeared
to circumscribe the Attorney General’s ability to stray away from the
plain language of the statute.
Regardless, by early 2009, a district judge in California enjoined
Attorney General Mukasey’s regulations from taking effect,116 and
Attorney General Eric Holder withdrew the regulations from review in
2010, ultimately releasing an updated version in 2013.117 Arizona
renewed its opt-in application under these new “guidelines” and faced
opposition from the Habeas Corpus Resource Center and the Office of
the Federal Public Defender for the District of Arizona.118 Litigation over
the issues of these entities’ standing to challenge the viability of the
regulations and Arizona’s qualification under them resulted in the district
court issuing a temporary restraining order, indefinitely halting the
progression of opt-in applications.119 In 2016, the district court’s order
was vacated because the entities did not have standing120 to challenge the
Attorney General’s regulations and had not brought forth issues ripe for

See id. at 156–57.
See id. at 168 & n.414.
See id. at 168.
Id. at 169.
28 U.S.C. § 2265(a)(3) (2012) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Kannenberg, supra note 59, at 169–70.
See JOSEPH A. MELUSKY & KEITH A. PESTO, THE DEATH PENALTY: DOCUMENTS
DECODED 123 (2014).
117. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 26.22–26.23 (2018).
118. Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 816 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2016).
119. Id. at 1247.
120. See id. at 1251.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 6 [], Art. 4

1502

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

dispute, as the Attorney General had yet to make a decision regarding
Arizona’s certification.121
Since then, opt-in certification procedure as enunciated by the
Attorney General has faded into the background of executive priority.
Last year, Arizona and Texas reapplied for certification at the behest of
former Attorney General Jeff Sessions but did so under the regulations as
they have stood since 2013.122 Several entities have filed commentary
severely undercutting the credibility of Texas’s proposed state
mechanism for appointing post-conviction counsel,123 with one lawsuit
specifically arguing that validating the mechanism under AEDPA would
violate the Constitution and the separation of powers doctrine.124 Such an
argument encapsulates what is at stake in approving any one opt-in
application without a template for what the Department should expect
from proposed post-conviction mechanisms.
The life of a capital defendant is imperiled by this chain reaction of
habeas calamities: the general disregard for the quality of counsel
received at the trial or appellate levels;125 the defaulted opportunity to
argue through habeas corpus these deficiencies in representation;126 and
finally, the willingness of departmental executives to overlook
substandard post-conviction counsel, appointed in apparent conformity
with unprincipled AEDPA provisions in impulsive pursuit of federal
docket expediency. Capital defendants and, frankly, the integrity of the
criminal justice system as a whole deserve more attention to detail than
this.
III. INTRODUCING THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018
The First Step Act was passed in December of 2018.127 It reflects
bipartisan collaboration on the critical issue of federal prison reform,128
as concerns over the staggering amount of federally incarcerated
prisoners serving decades or life sentences for minor drug offenses have

121. Id. at 1254.
122. See Cohen, supra note 54.
123. See, e.g., Texas Defender Service et al., Comment Letter on Texas’s Request for
Certification of Texas Capital Mechanism (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=DOJ-OLP-2017-0010-0048 [https://perma.cc/PUE9-9FKX].
124. See Cohen, supra note 54.
125. See supra Section II.C.1.
126. See id.
127. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 18, 34, and 42 U.S.C.).
128. See Lopez, supra note 14.
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been voiced in Washington and over social media by those debating the
objectives of the federal prison system.129
The Act’s website promises to prepare federal prisoners to “come
home from prison job-ready . . . [with] major incentives to pursue the lifechanging classes that will help them succeed on the outside.”130 Such
language already stands in stark contrast to prior criminal reform that
emphasized the heavy-handedness of the government in ensuring that
people remain behind bars.131 Further, a page from the Act’s website
explicitly emphasizes the importance of rehabilitating those making their
way through the criminal justice system and offers several provisions for
ensuring that the focus remains on rehabilitation.132
The Act capitalizes on an existing “Good Time Credits” program in
moving towards liberating people who have already accumulated credit
for good behavior, refines prerelease custody, and institutes incentives
within prisons for participation in First Step programs.133 These programs
include courses focused on skill-building, education, and vocational
training that are geared towards those most at risk of recidivism.134 The
Act further hopes to ensure that people are incarcerated closer to home,
provide more amenities for women and pregnant women, institute a
system of providing prisoners who are scheduled for release with
identification cards to help facilitate re-assimilation, and lower the age
for “compassionate release” of elderly prisoners.135
Additionally, the Act completely dismantles the “three strikes rule”
passed under AEDPA.136 This rule once ensured that those being tried for
a third felony would automatically receive a life sentence and was one of
the most hotly contested provisions of AEDPA.137 Now, judges may only
automatically impose a twenty-five-year sentence on three-time felons.138
The First Step Act, though indicative of Congress’s willingness to
collaborate on prison and sentencing reform, has been criticized by some
129. See, e.g., Brenden Gallagher, Why the Senate’s First Step Act Isn’t True Criminal
Justice Reform, DAILY DOT (Dec. 19, 2018, 6:48 AM), https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/first-step
-act-senate/ [https://perma.cc/7X28-CMWZ]; Sentencing Project (@SentencingProj), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/sentencingproj?lang=en [https://perma.cc/AW7B-XQN9] (demonstrating
reform efforts on social media).
130. S.2795 – The First Step Act, #FIRSTSTEPACT, https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/
rebuildthedream/pages/19887/attachments/original/1538770173/cut50_FSA_1_pager_-_both_
sides_-_v5_6518.compressed.pdf?1538770173 [https://perma.cc/F3KW-HZLX].
131. See supra Section II.A.
132. See S.2795 – The First Step Act, supra note 130.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Gallagher, supra note 129; see Lopez, supra note 14.
137. See Gallagher, supra note 129; Lopez, supra note 14.
138. Gallagher, supra note 129; see Lopez, supra note 14.
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as not doing enough to address mass incarceration rates nationwide.139
Because the number of federal prisoners is significantly lower than the
number of state prisoners,140 some criticize the Act for not accounting for
its limited impact on the lion’s share of America’s prison population.141
However, as its name implies, it is hoped to be the first of many steps that
Washington is willing to take to reform the way in which the country
thinks about imprisonment and its purpose.
Many people have feared for the Act’s long-term viability in light of
William Barr’s recent appointment as Attorney General.142 Barr shares
many of the same views on criminal reform as his predecessor, Jeff
Sessions.143 These views include a need to pursue more arrests, abide by
more stringent sentencing standards, and promote the public-safety
policy goal behind incarceration.144 It seems intuitive enough to connect
these views, already manifested at this early stage of reform, to future
agendas if, say, Arizona and Texas sustain their applications for opting
into AEDPA’s capital punishment provisions. If they do, Barr will likely
encourage these states to move their applications through just as Sessions
did before him.
Because congressional leaders and the Trump administration
presented the Act as a step in a series of criminal justice reforms, the
forthcoming steps should include some sort of consideration for capital
punishment and the interplay between state and federal court systems
implicated by AEDPA over twenty years ago. Specifically, the next step
in criminal justice reform should contemplate providing states and the
United States Attorney General with standards by which they may assess
the sufficiency of state post-conviction proceedings and the adequacy of
post-conviction counsel to successfully opt into AEDPA. Such standards
139. See Gallagher, supra note 129.
140. Id.
141. Compare id. (arguing that few inmates will be impacted by the First Step Act because
it does not apply to state prison systems), with James S. Liebman, An “Effective Death Penalty”?
AEDPA and Error Detection in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 414 (2001) (pointing out
the irony of AEDPA in that it was drafted as a means of facilitating capital punishment for federal
defendants like McVeigh, but its procedural and substantive provisions ultimately reaped severe
consequences on noncapital state prisoners attempting to have their habeas petitions heard).
142. See, e.g., Edward Chung, Trump Fails the First Step of the First Step Act, HILL (Jan.
10, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/424612-trump-fails-the-firsttest-of-the-first-step-act [https://perma.cc/X3L9-Q4BF]; see also infra text accompanying notes
167–71 (discussing the long-term future with William Barr as Attorney General).
143. See, e.g., Tammy Kupperman et al., Barr directs federal government to reinstate death
penalty, schedule the execution of 5 death row inmates, CNN POL. (July 25, 2019, 1:55 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/25/politics/justice-department-capital-punishment-barr/index.html
[https://perma.cc/U498-HF3N] (identifying Barr’s recent announcement to reinstate the federal
death penalty as a continuation of Sessions’ efforts to “restart [federal] executions by lethal
injection”).
144. See Chung, supra note 142.
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would mitigate an Attorney General’s improper certification of states that
do not, in reality, conform to expectations of an adequate post-conviction
mechanism under AEDPA. Further, these standards would encourage the
manufacture of seamless habeas corpus review, insulate capital
defendants specifically from falling prey to an unintelligible postconviction mechanism, and realign habeas corpus with constitutional
principles.
IV. THE NEXT STEP
In light of ongoing criminal law reform, Congress should reconsider
AEDPA’s opt-in provisions insofar as they contemplate states’ postconviction mechanisms for adjudicating habeas petitions. Imbuing these
provisions with ascertainable standards of competency for attorneys
litigating state habeas petitions affords petitioners across the country with
a necessary degree of due process and eliminates potential arbitrariness
in the qualification of a state for expedited federal review of habeas
petitions.
A. The Need to Articulate a Standard
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States.”145 The nondelegation principle146 was extracted from this
provision, curtailing Congress’s ability to delegate legislative authority
to the other branches of government.147 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v.
United States148 later sanctioned particular delegations of legislative
authority so long as Congress provided in the delegation “intelligible
principle[s]” of guidance for the receiving agency such that any resulting
legislation would assuredly have an imprimatur of congressional
influence.149
AEDPA, as amended by the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, certainly contains a delegation of legislative
authority to the Attorney General in its opt-in provisions. Section
145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
146. The nondelegation doctrine generally holds “that Congress cannot delegate its
legislative powers to other entities,” but subsequent cases have qualified this general prohibition
with standards by which Congress may constitutionally delegate some of its policymaking
functions. See Cornell Law Sch., Nondelegation Doctrine, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/nondelegation_doctrine [https://perma.cc/Q78H-HMRE].
147. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation
to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097 (2004) (explaining the textual, historical, and
judicial support for the nondelegation principle).
148. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
149. Id. at 409.
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2261(b)(1) of 28 U.S.C. specifically identifies the Attorney General as
capable of certifying that “a State has established a mechanism for
providing counsel in postconviction proceedings” pursuant to regulations
that he himself must promulgate according to 28 U.S.C. § 2265(b).150
However, it is nearly impossible to discern any guiding principles in
AEDPA that may aid the Attorney General and the Department in
devising and promulgating these opt-in regulations in accordance with
Congress’s intent. This is because Congress failed to articulate any
expectations for the Attorney General’s role in authoring regulations for
state post-conviction mechanisms seeking opt-in status. The only
requirements that Congress established for these mechanisms are found
in 28 U.S.C. § 2265(a)(1)(A), and they mandate that the Attorney General
expect candidate states to (1) appoint and compensate; (2) competent
counsel in post-conviction proceedings; and (3) for indigent capital
prisoners.151
The Attorney General’s most recent promulgated regulations reflect
an effort to articulate this delegation of legislative authority.152 For
example, in seeking to qualify AEDPA’s requirement for competent
counsel, the regulations incorporate a presumption of adequacy for state
standards of competency if the state’s post-conviction lawyers either
“have been admitted to the bar for at least five years and [possess] at least
three years of postconviction litigation experience”153 or conform with
state attempts to appoint competent counsel from public defender
programs, statutory entities devoted to capital case litigation, or judgeapproved rosters of lawyers.154
The issues with this requirement specifically, as a microcosm of the
regulations’ deficiencies as a whole, are twofold. Firstly, this provision
for competency has spawned varying interpretations about which
programs and entities qualify under this standardless expectation of
counsel.155 Some states believe that they have satisfied the vague notion
of competency embodied in the provision, whereas opponents to their
post-conviction mechanisms vigorously point to the deficiencies in
adeptness and relevant experience of these allegedly qualified habeas
attorneys.156 But because AEDPA does not contain objective,
quantifiable criteria by which to measure the true competency of these
150. 28 U.S.C. § 2261(b)(1) (2012).
151. See id. § 2265(a)(1)(A).
152. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 26.22–.23 (2018).
153. See id. § 26.22(b)(1)(i).
154. See id. § 26.22(b)(1)(ii); see also 42 U.S.C. § 14163(e)(1), (2)(A) (providing the public
health and welfare requirements cited to in the Attorney General’s regulation).
155. See infra Section IV.B.
156. Id.
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habeas attorneys, the debate will continue among states that believe the
AEDPA standards are both adequate and satisfied in states soliciting to
opt in and those that exhort further consideration of these mechanisms’
sufficiency. Secondly and facially, the Attorney General’s expectations
for habeas attorneys’ experience—either five years admitted to the bar
and with three years of post-conviction experience or appointment from
state-approved lists of attorneys157—are dangerously generic and
overinclusive.
B. Where to Begin?
To further pursue criminal reform and recommend objective and
effective competency standards by which post-conviction attorneys must
abide, Congress should revisit AEDPA’s opt-in provisions to prescribe
minimum experiential requirements for lawyers appointed to handle
capital habeas cases. Doing so would start the process of unifying the
standards to which state post-conviction mechanisms are held, thereby
improving the quality of state post-conviction counsel and, hopefully,
reducing the incidence of federal habeas petitions as a result.
Furthermore, this would serve to narrow congressional attention to the
issue of defendants’ rights, especially capital defendants’ rights, by
reiterating the importance of holding counsel to a certain standard of
competency at every level of litigation lest defendants bear the brunt of
attorneys’ negligence or inexperienced default of habeas claims.
Critics of Texas’s and Arizona’s opt-in applications pending before
the Attorney General have provided scathing feedback on their respective
post-conviction mechanisms. In their Comments in Opposition to
[Texas’s] Certification, the Texas Defender Service, Federal Public
Defender for the Northern District of Texas, and Federal Public Defender
for the Western District of Texas detailed how “Texas’s Appointment
Scheme Fails To Provide Standards Of Competency And Does Not
Assure The Appointment Of Competent Counsel.”158 Specifically, these
entities pointed out Texas’s blatant disregard for the “benchmark”
requirements for counsel contained in the Attorney General’s regulations
(that is, five years admitted to the bar and three years of post-conviction
experience)159 and Texas’s woefully “[i]nadequate” standards for
proficiency under the Texas Government Code.160
Likewise, the American Bar Association (ABA) submitted comments
in early 2019 on Arizona’s proposed post-conviction mechanism and
157.
158.
159.
160.

See 28 C.F.R. § 26.22(b)(1).
See Texas Defender Service et al., supra note 123, at 89.
Id. at 89–90.
Id. at 95–96.
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expressed concern with Arizona’s intention to recruit pro bono counsel
to represent capital defendants in satisfaction of the opt-in provisions.161
As the ABA stressed,
Pro bono law firms often do remarkable work on behalf of
their pro bono clients, but their lawyers are typically
inexperienced in criminal law and capital defense, and there
are numerous inefficiencies and challenges involved that
typically do not exist in a well-functioning system that relies
on experienced, adequately compensated capital defenders
to provide representation.162
In projecting reliance on pro bono counsel to litigate habeas petitions,
Arizona is ignoring the difficulties that several organizations, including
the ABA’s Death Penalty Representation Project, have experienced in the
past when attempting to recruit pro bono counsel for these capital cases:
the ABA wrote that its Death Penalty Representation Project has at times
spent “years . . . looking for a pro bono firm to take on a single [capital]
case,” sometimes failing to locate pro bono counsel that is up for the task
at all.163 Putting aside the argument that counsel secured on a pro bono
basis (that is, uncompensated) would, facially, appear to be at odds with
the language of AEDPA,164 it would simply be impossible to control for
adequate experience and commitment levels to post-conviction
proceedings amongst pro bono lawyers, even if such a pool of lawyers
willing to litigate habeas petitions existed.
However, Congress could eliminate a significant amount of ambiguity
regarding the suitability of post-conviction counsel if it amended AEDPA
to prescribe an objective and effective minimum experiential standard by
which attorneys involved in post-conviction proceedings could be
measured at the state level. Allowing Congress to take back control over
this one aspect of AEDPA would install a much more effective screening
process for counsel than the one currently proposed in the Attorney
General’s regulations. Five years of admission to the state bar and three
years of experience in post-conviction litigation does not ensure
competency for the myriad of lawyers who qualify under this umbrella:
161. American Bar Association, Comment Letter on Arizona’s Supplemental Information
Submission Regarding Arizona Capital Counsel Mechanism 2 (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2019jan7-ABAComment
letterAZDP.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RMR-WFZH].
162. Id. at 3.
163. Id.
164. See 28 U.S.C. § 2261(c) (2012) (“Any mechanism for the appointment, compensation,
and reimbursement of counsel . . . must offer counsel to all State prisoners under capital sentence
. . . .” (emphasis added)).
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the lawyer whose first habeas case does not present itself until his sixth
year in practice, the lawyer who has never served as lead counsel or
assistant lead counsel on a capital habeas case despite his three years of
“experience” in post-conviction proceedings, and the lawyer who might
have taken six hours of CLE classes every two years “devoted to the law
and practice of writs of habeas corpus” but who has never actually
litigated one.165 Allowing attorneys with such inadequate experience in
post-conviction habeas proceedings to represent indigent capital
defendants is a disservice to the states’ post-conviction mechanisms for
adjudicating their petitions, undermines defendants’ right to competent
counsel, and threatens federal review of these petitions. But such a
process would be authorized under the current scheme of unprincipled
congressional delegation of legislative authority to the Attorney General.
Congress must set the bar much higher for states to opt into AEDPA.
Specifically, Congress should consider writing into AEDPA a
requirement, which the Attorney General will subsequently implement
upon review of opt-in applications, that counsel appointed for postconviction capital habeas proceedings have served as lead counsel or
assistant lead counsel on a minimum of three capital cases instead of only
possessing three years of amorphous post-conviction experience. Further,
Congress should require a competent attorney to have dealt substantially
and significantly with habeas corpus issues during his five years of bar
admission. These sorts of standards will ensure that those appointed to
litigate a capital habeas petition will do so with adequate knowledge of
what is at stake, knowledge that is surmised not by subjective states’
standards of adequacy but by a national standard of competency provided
by Congress and consistently applied by the Attorney General.
C. A Legacy of Coexistence
Reconsideration of AEDPA in the manner contemplated above by
future iterations of the First Step Act or similar legislation would not
necessarily jeopardize AEDPA’s operation. Though many have called for
AEDPA’s dismantling, this Note proposes a modification of its
provisions in respect of federal habeas corpus review for more
evenhanded application of its standards and expectations. Specifically,
AEDPA, beginning with its opt-in provisions, must hone its focus on
incentivizing states to ensure adequate post-conviction mechanisms and
competent counsel in post-conviction proceedings so that habeas
165. See Texas Defender Service et al., supra note 123, at 97 (quoting Procedures Regarding
Eligibility for Appointment of Attorneys as Counsel under Article 11.071, Section 2(f), Code of
Criminal Procedure, and Regarding the Maintenance of a Statewide List of Attorneys Eligible for
Appointment as Required by Section 78.056, TEX. JUD. BRANCH ¶ 6 (Nov. 10, 2017),
https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1439687/procedures-capital-writs-appt-list-revised-11-10-17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/36NZ-3ZT9]).
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petitions and their processing at the state level remain deferential to
defendants’ rights. This level of respect for and devotion of resources to
defendants exhibited at the state level of habeas corpus processing would
benefit the court system’s efficiency as a whole. Effective litigation of
habeas corpus claims, such as ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
claims, would be adjudicated on their merits by experienced lawyers, thus
lowering the incidence of habeas filings at the federal level. Those that
do make it to federal court would be afforded the time and attention that
they deserve, no matter the statute of limitations, by a less-burdened
federal docket liberated by effective disposition of most petitions at the
state level.
AEDPA’s intention—to expedite federal review of capital habeas
petitions originating in state court—will remain attainable by states
wishing to opt in, but only if those states abide by the objective criteria
for counsel competency written into AEDPA by Congress. This would
inform the Attorney General’s discretionary certification decision for any
given state but also bind him to some articulated congressional intent on
the matter regardless of his personal political leanings. AEDPA’s opt-in
provisions and effective state post-conviction mechanisms, attainable via
the sort of criminal reform that the First Step Act heralds, would be able
to coexist within the framework of an intelligible principle.166
CONCLUSION
On February 14, 2019, the Senate confirmed William Barr as the
United States Attorney General.167 With this new turnover in power, it is
unclear which issues he will tackle first upon his return to the Attorney
General position,168 especially given the national media attention of other
issues over the past couple of years.169 Sources identifying the issues with
which Barr is most commonly associated overwhelmingly point to his
history of promoting “tough-on-crime” policies and discuss whether this
propensity will characterize his renewed tenure as Attorney General.170
166. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (setting forth
the intelligible principle doctrine).
167. David Shortell, William Barr Confirmed as Attorney General, CNN POL. (Feb. 14,
2019, 1:44 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/14/politics/william-barr-senate-confirmationvote/index.html [https://perma.cc/XU45-CHUD].
168. See Jon Schuppe, William Barr Was Confirmed as U.S. Attorney General. Here’s What
to Expect on Crime, Immigration and Marijuana, NBC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2019, 3:00 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/william-barr-was-confirmed-u-s-attorney-general-here
-s-n971066 [https://perma.cc/GAL7-697R] (explaining that Barr previously served as Attorney
General under President George H.W. Bush).
169. See id. (identifying the Mueller investigation and immigration as two dominating
issues).
170. Id.
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When asked about the First Step Act during his confirmation hearing,
Barr assured the senators that he “ha[d] no problem with the approach of
reforming the sentencing structure and [that he would] faithfully enforce
that law.”171 Of course, only time will tell whether such reform will
involve AEDPA, its elucidation, and its future bearing on capital
defendants seeking federal review of their habeas petitions.
Regardless, the time is ripe for Congress to revisit AEDPA and its
provisions for opting into expedited federal habeas review. Policymakers
must reorient their focus to the fact that no state has been able to opt into
AEDPA, either because their applications have failed or because the law
does not incentivize states to meet the requirements in contemplation of
an application,172 further signifying that these states have been unable to
establish post-conviction mechanisms staffed by competent counsel in
satisfaction of AEDPA’s current requirements. Congress should write
into AEDPA clearer expectations for competency of counsel to ensure
that states are held to a uniform, national standard of adequacy when
promoting their post-conviction mechanisms. This would, in turn,
increase their chances of certification under AEDPA’s opt-in provisions
while also providing their capital defendants with legitimate
representation during critical stages of their cases.
AEDPA’s provisions have increased the difficulty that any one habeas
petitioner may experience in having his claim heard in federal court, far
beyond the expectations of its drafters and scholars alike.173 The
consequences of such procedural difficulties are magnified for capital
defendants, who face the finality of the death penalty174 if their habeas
claims are defeated by a blanket application of AEDPA’s timing and
substantive provisions175 or are subjected to inadequate counsel
unconcerned with the gravitas of the particular case.176 In untangling the
web that AEDPA has spun around habeas petitioners, Congress and the
country as a whole may start by addressing the standards of competency
to which post-conviction counsel is held. This next, intelligible step in
171. Id.
172. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
173. See John H. Blume & W. Bradley Wendel, Coming to Grips with the Ethical Challenges
for Post-Conviction Representation Posed by Martinez v. Ryan, 68 FLA. L. REV. 765, 815 (2016)
(“It is not a hyperbole to classify the current regime as ‘Kafkaesque.’”); see also John H. Blume,
AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 291 (2006) (“At the time the
statute was enacted, few scholars (or habeas practitioners) fully understood or appreciated the
effect that the various limitations provisions would have.”).
174. See Robert Batey, Federal Habeas Corpus Relief and the Death Penalty: “Finality with
a Capital F,” 36 FLA. L. REV. 252, 254–55 (1984) (“[T]he process resulting in an execution must
be above reproach. No reasonable suspicion that the state has executed an innocent person or one
condemned to death by unconstitutional means can be tolerated.”).
175. See supra Section II.C.1.
176. See supra Section IV.B.
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criminal law reform has the potential to satisfy the various egos—federal,
state, and individual—involved in the discussion, and most importantly,
to restore to defendants convicted of capital offenses the federal
constitutional safeguards expressed in the writ of habeas corpus.
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